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Abstract 
In the 1970-80ies critical assessments of the problematic state of psychology as science were 
flourishing, stressing the theoretical disintegration and practical irrelevance of psychological basic 
research and connecting both defects to a misplaced dependence of mainstream psychology on a 
scientistic notion of scientific cognition. Talks of a crisis in psychology were gaining ground again. 
Controverting the paradigmatic maturity vs. the pre-/non-paradigmatic state of our discipline or, 
alternatively, its necessarily multi-paradigmatic character, the quest for unification as against a 
programmatic theoretical pluralism became a top issue of scholarly dispute. The institutionalisation 
of ISTP in 1985 and its initial epistemological and meta-theoretical core themes clearly reflected 
this pervasive trend. Some 35 years later, it has become noticeably quiet about such concerns, and 
there is no evidence of a renewal of large-scale discussions on a foundational crisis in psychology, 
let alone of ambitious attempts at theoretical unification or re-foundation – despite the fact that 
none of the “epistemopathologial“ (Koch, 1981) diagnoses of traditional variable-psychology have 
been refuted or lost strategic importance. Combining historical retrospection with an exemplary 
analysis of topical theoretical-psychological subjects, the aim of my paper is to get a clearer idea 
of where Theoretical Psychology currently stands in regard to the meta-scientific study of psy-
chological theory-problems.  
 
 
Keywords: grounded action, problems of replicability, crisis in psychology, scientific indeterminacy, 
unification. 
 
Pondering over a possible subject of my talk, I came up with the idea that it might be fitting 
for me as a veteran of ISTP to present a paper, in which I try, in a historical retrospect and 
at the same time a recollection of some of my own theoretical psychological contributions, 
to recognise where Theoretical Psychology stands in regard to the meta-scientific study of 
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psychological theory-problems. In particular, my concern is to clarify what has become of 
the scholarly debates on a foundational crisis in psychology as science and of the ambitious 
attempts at its unifying re-foundation, which were widespread in the 70-80ies and 
constituted one motivation for the establishment of independent theoretical-psychological 
infrastructures and its initial epistemological and meta-theoretical core themes.  
Psychology in a state of crisis 
On the founding conference of the ISTP at Plymouth in 1985 I introduced the approach of 
(German) Critical Psychology (Maiers, 1987), underlining its claim to contribute to the 
scientification of our discipline. In two respects this focus was not chosen accidentally.  
First, since the programmatic turn during the early seventies from a mere critique of the 
ideological biases and legitimating functions of bourgeois psychology towards a positive 
conception of a critical-emancipatory psychology based on Marxist theory, our primary 
work had been directed for more than a decade to a transdisciplinary historical 
reconstruction of the natural- and social-historical development of human consciousness. 
The objective of this historical categorial analysis (as we call it) of the psychological subject 
matter was to critically revise and re-define the basic concepts and methodological 
principles of psychology and, by this means, to render a coherent theorisation possible 
which no longer disregards human (inter-) subjectivity and achieves a higher level of 
scientific objectivity precisely for this reason (cf. also Maiers, 2001). 
Second, throughout the seventies and early eighties academics with a keen interest in 
epistemological, basic theoretical, and historical issues in psychology had increasingly 
engaged in vigorous discussions about the problematic state of psychology as science and 
the consequential need for a fundamental change. Synoptic overviews and meta-analyses of 
the manifold criticisms were provided, among others, by Giorgi (1970, pp. 79ff.), extracting 
a catalogue of predominant motifs of basic criticisms that had been expressed since 1950 
from the journal American Psychologist or by the Nebraska-Symposium on Motivation of 
1975, addressing the guiding theme Conceptual Foundations of Psychology (Arnold, ed., 
1976). Subsequent surveys of similar type can be found, e.g., in the APA symposium series 
A Century of Psychology as Science: Retrospections and Assessments edited by Koch & 
Leary (1985).  
Despite their different accentuations and ways of argumentation, such critical assessments 
agreed on emphasising, on the one hand, the lack of theoretical unity, i.e. disparate 
conceptualisations even within the same subject areas, fragmented theories, and an 
accumulation of unrelated and ambiguous empirical data, and, on the other hand, the 
trivialising problem formulations and hence limited knowledge value of psychological basic 
research for understanding crucial issues of individual conduct in the social lifeworld. Both 
defects – the theoretical disintegration and the practical irrelevance – were connected to 
the misplaced dependence of mainstream psychology on a scientistic notion of scientific 
cognition involving a primacy of methods over issues, for which Bakan (1967) trenchantly 
dubbed psychology “methodolatrous” (cf. Shames, 1987). 
Talks of a crisis in psychology gained ground again, sometimes reminiscent of pertinent 
surveys by Vygotsky and Bühler, both of 1927 (for a critical appraisal see Maiers, 1990a). 
Against the backdrop of a wide reception of the model of scientific development which 
Kuhn had set out in 1962, discussions arose on whether psychology had already reached the 
maturity of a paradigmatic science, conducting its manifold research programs on the basis 
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of commonly shared categories and methodological principles, or, on the contrary, whether 
such a fundament was still missing, so that psychology, as a non-, pre- or mis-paradigmatic 
discipline, was plunged into a scientific crisis. Consequently, the need and prospects of 
unification as against programs of theoretical pluralism (or even of pronounced eclecticism) 
as viable correctives became an issue of scholarly dispute. Interestingly, the latter view of 
psychology’s either necessarily non-paradigmatic or at best multi- or poly-paradigmatic 
character was held both by defenders of the traditional variable-psychology and by a number 
of proven critics such as Koch (1969), who pointedly took the stance that “psychology 
cannot be a coherent science”.  
It should be pointed out that the field at large was far from unanimous even about the 
precedence of this debate. Some expressly denigrated the discussion on crisis as a crisis of 
discussion. In his presidential address to the 1972 congress of the German Society for 
Psychology (DGPs), Herrmann, e.g., straightened out the official reading of the analytical-
experimental, nomothetical psychology and delivered an explicitly positive summary not 
alone of the institutional advancement of psychology as a discipline of study and 
professional field, but likewise of its development as science: "The current attitude of verbal 
questioning can scarcely obscure this state of affairs." (Herrmann, 1974, p. 24). Two years 
before, his predecessor in office, Graumann, had admitted the grave doubts which "leading 
representatives of our own discipline have raised about the unity of the psychological 
science” (Graumann, 1973, p. 21). Consequently, he had underlined the challenge of 
reaching a new basis as a human science that overcomes the traditional theoretical distortion 
of subjectivity via a unifying and binding alternative definition of its object of knowledge. 
By contrast, Herrmann (1974, p. 19) considered psychology a variable network of non-
competing plural research programs which defy any derivation of an object-based unity of 
knowledge production, due to the heterogeneity of their actual objects, formulations of 
problems, and theoretical conceptualisations. Contrary to what he queried as failed 
essentialistic attempts at an ultimate definition, he regarded the identity of psychological 
studies as sufficiently defined in terms of the invariant strategies of nomological research.  
As already mentioned, such controversies were not new to psychology. From its inception 
as academic discipline, there have been perennial debates in the final analysis revolving 
around “the unsettled fundamental issue of the definite object of psychology as a science 
sui generis” (Traxel, 1976, pp. 105f.) and on the epistemic position of psychology between 
the poles of the (natural) sciences and the humanities. Various conceptual and 
methodological contentions (such as the issues of qualitative vs. quantitative method, of 
statistical vs. clinical thinking, etc.) can be linked with the classical contraposition of a 
natural-scientific, explanatory, nomothetical psychology to a distinct human-scientific, 
understanding, idiographic psychology – or, to put it another way, can be subsumed under 
the meta-theoretical controversy over whether and how this dichotomy can possibly be 
overcome. The practical settlement of this open question with the triumph of behavioural 
psychology proved to be a schismatic Pyrrhic victory: The accusation that its objectivism is 
at most catching only half of the subject matter, if not missing it altogether, has never muted 
and has gained momentum with the circulation of models of human agency and subjectivity 
from diverse theoretical points of departure (such as phenomenology, symbolic 
interactionism, ethnomethodology, social constructionism, or psychoanalysis, etc.). With us 
again is the time-honoured issue of the reconcilability of the intentional and the causal, the 
idiographic and the nomothetical modes of thinking.  
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In short: During its nearly 150 years of institutionalised existence, psychology has never got 
rid of its endemic flaw with respect to the due conceptual self-understanding, and to me it 
appears a compelling conclusion that the de facto or on principle declared "renunciation of 
the unitary conception of the psychological science" (Graumann, 1973, p. 22) can only 
perpetuate the crisic status quo. Not surprisingly, however, even among those who share 
this argument it remains a controversial issue how to respond positively to such a challenge. 
The quest for reorientating psychology: Dualistic or 
monistic ways out? 
The historical bifurcation of academic traditions and cultures proves to have a negative 
impact on the contemporary determination of direction. Various (non-Marxist) critiques of 
the prevailing naturalism and mechanicism of psychology have led to subject-psychological 
counter-programs designed to substitute, or at least to complement, what they consider the 
scientism – in their reading: the natural-scientific bias – of the psychological mainstream. 
(For concrete examples see Maiers,1988.) This critical verdict is liable to be taken in by 
historical legends in so far as it levels the interdisciplinary difference and intradisciplinary 
diversity of the cognitive processes within the realm of natural sciences.  
For one, it typically ignores the option of a completely divergent trajectory that psychology 
would have followed, had it orientated itself by (evolutionary) biology as a type of science 
informed by developmental thinking. (I skip the snares such a direction of development 
carries with it in turn, if one fails to think the history of nature through to the end and hence 
misconstrues the emergence of autonomous societal structures and processes, that do not 
fall under the cognizance of biology.)  
Similarly misleading is, second, the criticism of a reductionist psychology more physico, if 
it confounds the analytical-experimental research practice and kind of theorisation of 
physics with the positivist rationale of physicalism. (I recommend to re-/read the revealing 
analysis propounded by Koch, 1976, of psychology’s vain efforts as an imitation science.)  
As the deeper basis of this bias, I discern a failure to recognise the essential point of 
commonality uniting the antipodes of the classical dualism in that both sides metaphysically 
tear apart nature and history. In order to radically overcome the dominating psychological 
naturalism, psychology evidently has to understand the societability and historicity of the 
human beings – however in such a way, that the essential natural-historical preconditions 
of this human condition are taken into consideration. Psychology will only be able to meet 
this theoretical challenge, when it is consistently geared to a transdisciplinary production 
of knowledge (cf. Maiers, 2001). This quintessence would be also in accordance with the 
development of science in general and the unquestionable historicisation of episteme in the 
exact branches in particular, which deny a dichotomous classification of scientific 
disciplines, as this utterly mistakes their real links in terms of their ontological and 
epistemological bases (cf. Maiers,1988, for the preceding section).  
Another point is, that such criticisms, not uncommonly, undermine their own position in as 
much as they take it that for the sake of including subjectivity one has to radically lessen 
claims to scientific rigour. Such a contrast blindly reproduces the traditional notion of 
subjective (self-) experience as a private inwardness and nolens volens confirms the 
hegemony of variable-psychology in interpreting the standards of a properly objective 
methodology instead of countering it with an independent definition. This vulnerability, 
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together with the aporetic burdens of the historical prototypes of dualistic critique, facilitates 
a broad defence within our discipline which downplays the existent challenge of founding 
an integrated and integrating conception of the psychological subject area, theoretical 
discourse, and methodology altogether.  
For lack of space, I cannot elaborate my view here (but see Maiers, 1988, and 2001) that 
such anti-monistic positionings play a part in dignifying the scientific crisis of psychology. 
To the extent that their criticism blindly lumps together epistemic monism, the physicalistic 
unitary science project, natural scientific research practice, and the ontological argument of 
ahistoricity and uniformity, they remain trapped in what they intend to repudiate: i.e., the 
abstract-ahistorical, scientistic notion of the unity of science handed down by logical 
empiricism. The mistakenness of the latter epistemic absolutism, however, does not per se 
contradict the possibility of a non-dogmatic theoretical monism acknowledging the 
manifold aspects of reality and being immune to ruling out or levelling different points of 
view.  
The problem posed here is none to be resolved in terms of a formal logic of science, but 
points to the need for a fundamental material revision of the traditional conceptual and 
methodological definition of the psychological subject matter. 
Theoretical Psychology as critical epistemology of 
psychological knowledge 
The pervasive trend towards critical assessments of our psychological knowledge, which 
had evolved over many years, became reflected in the institutionalisation of Theoretical 
Psychology as a specific concern in its own right. As early as 1951, Koch noted that since 
the end of World War II psychology had been in a long and intensifying crisis. Progress 
from its current pre-theoretical stage could be achieved only by the pursuit of theoretical 
psychology which would  
 
prosecute five major interrelated tasks: (1) Education in the methodology and logic of science; 
(2) analysis of methodological or ‘foundation’ problems that are more or less unique to psychol-
ogy; (3) internal systematization of suggestive, but formally defective, theoretical formulations; 
(4) intertranslation and differential analysis of conflicting theoretical formulations; (5) the 
construction of new theory. (p. 298). 
 
A major step toward creating an organisational basis for such meta-psychological 
theoretical work was the first Banff Conference on Theoretical Psychology, held April 1965 
and leading to the establishment of the Center for Advanced Study in Theoretical 
Psychology at the University of Alberta two years later (cf. Royce, 1970). Theoretical-
psychological units also came into existence in a few European universities (mainly in the 
Netherlands and at Heidelberg in Germany). In 1984, the Alberta Center launched Annals 
of Theoretical Psychology, an ongoing series designed to further the dialogue on theoretical 
principles and philosophical issues within psychology and related fields. Against this 
background and as a consequence of informal discussions among scholars from across the 
globe committed to the metascientific study of psychological theorisation, a conference was 
organised for August 1985 at Plymouth, UK, with a view to establishing some sort of 
independent forum: viz., our International Society for Theoretical Psychology. As a 
supplement to this new discourse framework, the journal Theory & Psychology was released 
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in 1991. (For additional information about the rebirth of the theoretical-psychological 
discourse see also Madsen, 1987; Baker et al., 1988; Baker, 1988; Stam, 1991, 2017.)  
Not so much meant for specialists’ circles as for a broad psychological audience interested 
in reflecting foundational issues of psychology from philosophical, epistemological, 
metatheoretical, methodological, historical, and sociological perspectives, all these 
instruments have significantly promoted the clarification of the fundamental prerequisites 
and cognitive tools for an adequate treatment of characteristic psychological theory 
problems leading out of traditional antinomies, and for a constructive advancement of 
comprehensive and substantive theory. 
In this vein, one emphasis within Theoretical Psychology was on psychology’s 
fragmentation outlined above and hence on the metatheoretical issue of whether or not 
systematisation, integration, let alone unification, constitute a valuable goal in Theoretical 
Psychology and, if so, whether this goal ought to be achieved on a pluralistic or monistic 
epistemic base. I mention in this regard the 1st Banff conference in 1969 and a number of 
publications during the early eighties, as e.g. Volume 3 of the Annals of Theoretical 
Psychology, New Ideas of Psychology, or neopositivist initiatives such as the founding of 
the Society for Studying Unity Issues in Psychology (SUNI) in 1986, and the publication of 
an International Newsletter of Uninomic Psychology. Not least, it was a subject of 
controversial discussion within ISTP, most notably during the first meetings (1985, 1987, 
and 1991). Likewise, an early volume of Theory & Psychology (1991) took up this thematic 
focal point. 
With its dissent on the monism-pluralism issue, Theoretical Psychology mirrors at a meta-
level the overall conceptual and methodological split of psychology. In such circumstances, 
historical research becomes especially relevant as a guide (cf. Maiers, 1990b). With good 
reason then, theoretical psychologists have occupied themselves time and again with “the 
relevance of history to theory, or psychology in general. In other words, how and what could 
'doing history' contribute to (theoretical) problems that face contemporary psychology" 
(Van Rappard et al., 1993, p. vii). Outside the theoretical psychological quarters, however, 
contemporary psychology gives a different picture: Studies pertaining to the history of 
science are being marginalised, and at least for the German-speaking psychology it is the 
case that a critical historiography plays only a minor part in today’s Bachelor’s and Master’s 
degree programmes. Revealingly, this curricular neglect has met with resistance only by the 
small and not very powerful DGPs section History of Psychology.  
To summarise: The ISTP took up and has broadened the scope of metatheoretical 
considerations, within which reflections about the crisis of psychology and the 
consequential necessities have indeed constituted a core topic from the very beginning. 
Foundational challenges – fallen out of time? 
Some 35 years later, it has become noticeably quiet about the above issues, and there is no 
evidence of a renewal of large-scale discussions on a foundational crisis in psychology, let 
alone of ambitious attempts at theoretical unification or refoundation. Taking, by way of 
example, another look at the biennial developmental reports on the state of German 
psychology, it becomes apparent that none of the presidential addresses following 
Graumann’s and Herrmann’s accounts makes mention of fundamental criticisms of the 
course and state of scientific research in our field, occasional skeptical undertones 
notwithstanding. Critical notes primarily refer to barriers to the institutional progress of the 
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discipline and/or the professional psychological practice. Overall, these reports draw a 
picture of a successfully advancing science. What passes for successful theoretical work in 
their assessments is only too well known from today’s standard journal articles or textbook 
chapters, which, as a rule, review some circumscribed empirical domain, debate detailed 
methodological issues of a highly specialised sub-area, and finish accounts of experimental 
findings with conjectures about underlying law-like generalities. It seems that theory as the 
average empirical research psychologist is accustomed to is persistently viewed as 
something one does after collecting the data to fill in the gaps left by our observations.  
With a few notable exceptions, theory construction is being relegated to the periphery of the 
discipline – if it means producing broad-gauged explanatory theoretical structures over a 
wide range of psychological phenomena and problems, breaking traditional boundaries 
between sub- and neighbouring disciplines, and involving a critical revision of the stock 
of theories in psychology including ontological, epistemological, and methodological 
as well as historical and social theoretical concerns about systematic aspects (see also 
Stam, 1991). Consequently, until today the mainstream has perseveringly disregarded 
foundational problems, that psychology has been caught up with time and again, and that 
seem to have got a last hearing in the crisis debates of the seventies and eighties. 
Psychology astray? Problems of replicability 
All the more remarkable is therefore the current turmoil in the face of massive problems 
with replicating findings of experimental and correlational studies, which became identified 
in the early 2010s as a crisis of replication (cf. Simmons et al., 2011; Open Science 
Collaboration, 2015; Green, 2019 [2021]; Maiers, 2019b [2021]). How are we to evaluate 
this growing unrest within the mainstream of nomological variable-psychology? Since the 
anomaly of non-replicability has a direct bearing on its very own methodological 
requirements and quality criteria of empirical research, the dismay comes as no real surprise. 
Nonetheless, I rather doubt that the discussions will yield sweeping effects on the future 
course of psychological research. Considering the disregarding of earlier warnings in the 
1960s that something has gone terribly wrong with the conventional statistical procedures 
around significance testing (e.g., Rozeboom, 1960; Hays,1963; Bakan,1967; Meehl, 1967; 
similarly in the German-speaking psychology Holzkamp,1964 and 1970), I would anticipate 
that the excitement within the mainstream of empirical research will sooner or later die 
down. Quite apart from that, it strikes me that the critique falls short by confining its focus 
to a purely method-immanent analysis, more precisely: to the violation of sacrosanct 
standards.  
The often heard call for even more methodical rigour on the usual path in order to secure 
unambiguous empirical findings gives at least rise to suspect that the conceivably deeper 
reason for this anomaly is not yet recognised: namely, the misguided regulations of a 
purportedly strictly objective inquiry investigating empirical phenomena of subjectivity as 
consequences of situative conditions conceived as causal effects, and treating the subjective 
of the subject matter as the central root of interfering factors to be eliminated or neutralised 
in the pursuit of experimental-statistical hypothesis testing. This objectivist effect paradigm 
or conditionality thinking [Wirkungsparadigma/Bedingtheitsdenken] distorts what is 
present and relevant in everyday life. No wonder, that the data so obtained are tainted with 
uninterpretability and a lack of scientific objectivity. 
The difficulties with replicability would thus be proof once again that the notorious 
inversion between matter and method does not really work, due to the characteristics of 
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human inter-/subjectivity. In this sense, we can say that the replication crisis replicates the 
eternal topic of all historical discussions about a crisis in psychology: i.e., the failure of a 
psychology without subject.. 
Theoretical Psychology nowadays: Have epistemological-metatheoretical concerns 
become less important? 
Let me now try to get an idea of where Theoretical Psychology currently stands in regard to 
the meta-scientific study of the aforementioned psychological theory problems.  
Going by the range of prevalent topics in recent ISTP conference proceedings or issues of 
the journal Theory and Psychology and comparing their multifaceted spectrum of subjects 
with the relatively clear-cut thematic priorities of the early ISTP debates on issues such as 
epistemic unification, monism vs pluralism, realism vs constructionism, relativism and anti-
foundationalism, deconstruction of universal truth claims, views on representation, 
correspondence and progress of knowledge, and so forth, one can hardly overlook certain 
alterations of priorities and forms of theoretical discourse and radical psychology critique. 
Broadly speaking, the societal, political, and institutional contexts of academic and 
professional psychology have come to attract a growing interest, while metatheoretical-
epistemological reflections currently seem to be fading into the background. (The present 
Copenhagen conference with its central theme can serve as another example.) Notabene: 
Contrary to what might be a conventional preconception of Theoretical Psychology, all of 
this fits well into the province of ISTP to foster a theoretical knowledge which is relevant 
to everyday use by means of examining more closely the social function of psychologists' 
common practices and shedding light on linkages of psychological theories with real-world 
political developments. 
Looking for an explanation of this presumed shift in emphasis, my first suggestion was that 
philosophical and meta-theoretical positions had become sufficiently delineated at a certain 
point, so that a continuation of the debate along the same lines of argument promised no 
longer a relevant gain of knowledge. Beside other tentative assumptions, I also suspected 
that especially among a generation of academics who grew up with (if not actively shaped) 
the deconstructionist approach of postmodern philosophy and social theory to grand 
narratives and hegemonic truth claims, any unifying or, even more so, foundational project 
is per se at risk of evoking scepticism. 
While there may be something to such provisional explanations, on second sight my attempt 
to plot topical trends over the ISTP conferences as well as over issues of Theory and 
Psychology proved quite difficult, and my initial impression, that within ISTP and the 
international circles of Theoretical Psychology at large concerns about categorial-
methodological and other foundational problems of psychological theory foundational 
issues may somewhat have fallen into oblivion, turned out over-hasty. In fact, down to the 
present day numerous individual studies have been dedicated to this main topic.  
The bottom-line is: While relatively clear–cut conceptions of the metascientific endeavour 
of Theoretical Psychology may have formed a common ground for, say, the initiators and 
founding members of ISTP, the understanding of Theoretical Psychology has (justifiably 
so) vastly expanded in the meantime – if it has ever corresponded to the alleged blueprint. 
To quote the editors of the Nanjing Conference Proceedings (Stenner et al, 2011, p. ix):  
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(...) there is no unified program of theoretical psychology, and hence no standardized set of 
problems to solve, or methods with which to solve them. (…)These problems are many and 
varied (…) – and hence it is appropriate that a range of different approaches should arise in 
response.  
 
This statement might be found in similar wordings in the prefaces to other proceedings as 
well, as they all wrestle with the problem of how to categorise papers concerning Theoretical 
Psychology. Take note, already in 1985 it was pretty clear, that in spite of the initial 
consensus “what constitutes ‘theoretical psychology is quite an open ended issue” (Baker et 
al, 1988, p. v). So far, so good. However, the quotation from Stenner and colleagues is 
followed by a second statement, which I wish to underline no less: “(…) theoretical 
psychologists still have to grapple with (…) the enduring and pervasive ‘wicked’ problem 
of the discipline’s lack of firm foundations”. (Stenner et al, 2011, ibid.)  
While no one can possibly wish to (re-) instate dogmatic claims of any position of an 
exclusive uniform understanding of the theoretical psychological domain, it is nevertheless 
the case that for Theoretical Psychology to be able to contribute to comprehensive and 
relevant psychological theorisation, its initial core business of elucidating fundamental 
epistemological-metatheoretical problems (following Koch’s above-mentioned, albeit too 
narrowly defined, early layout of objectives) needs to be insistently retained. After all, none 
of the “epistemopathologial“ (Koch, 1976) diagnoses of the precarious situation of 
traditional variable-psychology has been refuted – let alone remedied. As a random sample 
of this impasse, let me instance three cases. 
Endemic flaws of psychology 
Case 1: Scientific indeterminacy 
It is still symptomatic of our discipline that different theories about identical objects or 
subject-areas co-exist, each making universal claims on the basis of mutually exclusive (or 
at least ambiguously related) conceptualisations and each being equally empirically 
confirmed according to prevailing standards – leaving us in the awkward position of being 
unable to decide which of the theories is tenable and which one ought to be rejected or 
retained with limited validity. Accordingly, the historical sequence of basic theoretical 
conceptions in psychology frequently has the appearance of a sequence of fads, without any 
recognised grounds for the replacement of one by another and without leading to a qual-
itative deepening of our knowledge. Hence, both questions and answers, that are at any 
particular time out of style, remain latent as unresolved – only to recur one day.  
In 1977, Holzkamp identified this problem as the scientific arbitrariness of conventional 
psychological theorising, which he traced back to the fact that (in conformance with the 
halved rationality of a traditional logic of science excluding the context of discovery from 
its scope) traditional psychology has left the origin of its categories undetermined. The basic 
concepts, in terms of which the theoretically generalised assumptions about the 
interconnections between situational/personal conditions and behaviorial/experiential 
events are couched, are presupposed as such and gain their scientific status only secondarily 
through the testing of derived hypotheses.  
As Holzkamp pointed out, the empirical reference of a theory is epistemically predetermined by 
the kind of conceptualisations employed, its so-called categorial reference. It depends on 
concepts such as reinforcement, which empirical facts or object aspects can become the focus of 
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a theory, here: of learning. What matters is that the categorial definitions are not possibly 
covered through testing the derivated hypothetical assumptions. Reinforcement or Skinner‘s 
superordinate concept of operant conditioning,  
from which the hypothesis has been deduced that, e.g., learning success depends on the rate 
of reinforcement, are not subject to negotiation with the falsification of the latter. This is the 
case, because with respect to the dimensions of reality reproduced in the theoretical 
constructs there exists a circular relation between the systematic assumptions hereby 
conceptualised, their assumed optimal operationalisation in empirical (dependent and 
independent) variables, and the kind of correspondingly producible findings. Only the 
degree of verifiability of hypotheses within the framework of the theoretically grasped 
dimensions escapes this circularity. In other words, empirical testing in the conventional 
sense does not provide a sufficient criterion for the scientific value and relevance of theories, 
which may therefore pertain to entirely peripheral or artificial effects.  
Since, on the other hand, the procedures for constructing hypotheses offer no standards for 
a method-driven, verifiable derivation of relevant concepts and formulation of theories, the 
predicament of scientific arbitrariness outlined above is the result. This condition also 
entails a fatal indifference to different layers of meaning within the psychological subject 
matter and, by implication, to characteristic category mistakes in explaining human action 
(see below, case 3). 
Even though Holzkamp’s problem analysis was backed by corresponding critical voices 
within the scientific community, only a few peers versed in the logic of science were 
prepared to join issue with him (Gadenne, 1978; Brocke & Holling, 1982). The vast majority 
within the psychological mainstream passed over this fundamental criticism in silence, and 
there is no indication that the problem has been settled in the meanwhile.  
Case 2: Interference of non-empirical elements in hypotheses on contingent events 
My second case draws on the trenchant analyses from various approaches of the intricate 
conjunction of empirical elements and structural implications within psychological 
statements, which needs to be critically scrutinised prior to the design of empirical studies. 
Despite its central relevance to the formulating and testing of substantial hypotheses, this 
desideratum has attracted only marginal attention in the field – with the consequence of 
widespread conceptual confusions and pseudo-empirical research questions (cf. Maiers, 
2009). 
Incompatible with the traditional presupposition that the connection between variables is 
one between independent contingent facts in the objective reality itself, so that the prediction 
of certain behavioural consequences from antecedents may either come true or not, 
Brandtstädter (1982; 1984) convincingly worked out that experimental effects as supposed-
to-be tests of the empirical validity of psychological theories are frequently implied in the 
conceptual, formal, or material structures of psychological theories and therefore a priori 
certain. Even more radically, Smedslund (1984; 1988) argued that contemporary 
psychology is essentially based on common sense concepts, which are neither capable nor 
in need of empirical tests. The experimental practice is thus misleading, and its results are 
to be regarded as pseudo-empirical.  
Their detection of implicative linguistic structures or logical-semantic relationships as 
constitutive parts of psychological theories bears a certain similarity to the critical 
psychological view that the common variable-analysis does not simply miss the 
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intentionality inherent in the psychological subject matter – what is more, traditional theory 
building does not even observe the logic of this analysis consistently (cf. Maiers, 1993).  
A few words on the relationship between human agents and their world seem to be in order. 
In a nutshell, this relationship is distinguished by possibility relations and subjective 
grounds for action. From the individual standpoint, the historically produced forms of 
practice signified by objective social meanings represent generalised possibilities for action 
to which individuals to which individuals in principle can consciously relate. Depending on 
currently effective needs or interests, the objective conditions and meanings – as 
experienced and appraised by individuals – function as premises for action intentions. This 
specifically human mode of existence should also determine the form of scientific 
theorising: In contradistinction to the linear causality implicated in the notion of conditioned 
behaviour, the key concept of subjective grounds for action represents the mediational level 
between conditions as occasions for acting and the real execution of action. As an expression 
of mediated determination, it draws a specific conclusion from the philosophical and social 
scientific debate on causes vs. reasons and on a weak form of determinism, which does 
justice to the uncircumventable human freedom of action (cf. Robinson, & Mos, 1990; 
Maiers, 2007).  
The point of the story is that common psychological theories, to the extent that they focus 
on human action proper, refer to its underlying subjective grounds, albeit nonreflectively 
and concealed by a rhetoric of mere conditionality. Particular grounds to act necessarily 
follow from what individuals hold to be reasonable in pursuing their respective life interests 
under given situational and personal circumstances, premises in our terms. Assumptions 
about grounds for action do not predict the occurrence of behavioural effects. Accordingly, 
they cannot be treated as empirically falsified when they fail to materialise: They simply do 
not apply to cases where the supposed premises are absent. Such failure to fit, however, 
would not affect the meaningfulness or discursive soundness of the introduced hypothesis 
about a premises-grounds relationship as (much as) its defining features can possibly be 
fulfilled by a different constellation of real circumstances as suitable cases of application. 
Hence, with a sufficient specification of premises and intentions, any either-or may reveal 
itself as both-and or it depends (Holzkamp, 1986, pp. 220ff.; cf. Maiers, 1993). 
The theory element of subjective grounding patterns [Begründungsmuster] is inconsistent 
with the traditional view of an adequate form of psychological theory and undermines the 
supposition that empirical/experimental findings provide tests of the respective theoretical 
proposition. Attempts to test such implicative structures as contingent if-then-hypotheses 
are indeed tantamount to pseudo-science. To avoid any misunderstanding, I indicate that 
this critical view of the conventional understanding of explaining and predicting immediate 
relationships between conditions and events by no means renounces the commitment to 
scientific realism with its conviction that the empirical truth of theoretical statements can in 
principle be evaluated. Nor does it suggest an essential dichotomy between a positivist-
factual (nomothetical) psychology of causes and an interpretive (idiographic) psychology 
of reasons – the contrary is the case (see below). 
But it does strike at psychology's methodological heart: the experimental-statistical 
verifiability of theories, and proves the received own image of psychology as nomological 
explanatory science on a third person's observation base to be a mystifying self-
misunderstanding of its real scientific practice. Even so, when seen from a certain historical 
distance, Holzkamp’s critical scrutiny just like Brandtstädter’s or Smedslund’s parallel 
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exposition of unnoticed conceptual confusions and pseudo-empirical research practice 
[Pseudoempirie] prevailing in traditional psychology have practically come to nothing. 
Case 3: The want of a concretely generalisable psychological unit of analysis 
This case refers to the diagnosis that psychology is constrained by an explicit or implicit, 
ambiguous dualism of heterogeneous (if not contradictory) systems of theory languages 
about human acting and experiencing, aptly named a discourse of conditionality versus a 
discourse of groundedness [Bedingtheits- vs. Begründetheitsdiskurs]. On the 4th and 5th 
ISTP meetings, I argued in support of a monistic program for integration based on the 
category of meaningful grounded action (Maiers, 1993; 1995). Both the mainstream-
psychological discourse of conditionality and the common dualist methodology designed 
for action versus behavior as exclusively distinct units of analysis, equally distort the 
meaningful world and human agency.  
As opposed to either distortion I explained that a concept of meaningful grounded action is 
capable of accounting for human agency while allowing for a consistent relation with non-
intentional features of behavior. Hence it is an apt candidate for achieving theoretical 
unification within core areas of psychology. It goes without saying, that such a concept of 
action must not be narrowed in a rationalistic manner and bound to criteria of a deliberate 
goal-directedness and – pursuit. Indeed, a person’s grounds need not be conscious, alleged 
grounds may in part coincide with or cover true ones, and so forth. The discourse of 
groundedness as a methodology of dialogical understanding only requires that grounds 
somehow build an aspect of the actual horizon of an individual's subjective experience and 
hence allow for their possible reconstruction.  
The problem with dualism arises where it offers disparate approaches and conflicting 
theoretical systems for one and the same (!) level of the active conscious relating of persons 
to the world. Rejecting any version of a bipartite psychology is therefore not tantamount to 
objecting to the simultaneous analysis of different system levels of human behavioural and 
mental processes in terms of distinct theoretical descriptions. Compare, e.g., psychological 
subject matters such as binocular depth viewing and social perception. To adopt 
undiscriminatingly in either case the discourse of conditionality and talk of stimulus patterns 
or the like conjures away incomparable modes of existence. In the same way, one would 
make a category mistake if one talked in terms of intentionality in the reverse case of 
autonomous effects of psychical functioning that are either not experientially given or, as 
something happening to me, not at my control or disposal. Only on this level, where a 
reflective self-interpretation of the agent can be ruled out, the theoretical depiction of 
causally determined behavior is appropriate. It is my conviction that a careful examination 
would reveal that many of the usually given candidates for non-intentional theorising do not 
stand the test to represent theories of pure mechanism. Rather, they retain, at least implicitly, 
the reference to a situated, volitional and cognizant agent, only thus disclosing the meaning 
of their propositions. Whether or not it is appropriate to suspend the model of reflective 
action can only be answered through a concrete analysis of the material.  
It appears that adopting the specific level of the discourse of groundedness as the primary 
frame of reference makes a coherent theorisation possible that takes account of the dynamic 
interdependence of volitional and conscious processes as well as of unintentional and 
unconscious processes or of objective causalities and befalling events [Widerfahrnisse]. The 
tentative explication of action does not only allow for determining possible lower deviations 
from intentionality and objective causal effects within an overarching teleonomy of acting. 
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Starting from this higher level of specificity, it becomes also possible to define the interface 
to the non-intentionalist descriptive pattern of conditional behaviour, which applies to an 
elementary determination level of psychophysical mechanisms functioning in accordance 
with laws of nature. By contrast, taking the unspecific discourse of conditionality as a point 
of departure appears to have no prospect of success in establishing a comprehensive theory 
frame allowing for a consistent, non-reductionist mediation between discrete levels of 
specificity of acting. In other words, the concept of grounded action provides a possibility 
to demarcate the correlation and validity conditions of the non-intentionalist and 
intentionalist theory languages and to ensure theoretical unity covering wide areas of 
psychology. In my contribution to the Tokyo ISTP meeting (Maiers, 2019a), I therefore 
refuted the contemporary learning psychological strategy of a reductionist mapping of 
higher level learning activities onto elementary processes of stochastic (inductive rule) 
learning. As an alternative, I advocated a sophisticated model of grounded action 
comprising conditionality as applying to non-specific features of agency as a starting point 
for a coherent theoretical account of intentional and non-intentional (incidental or even 
implicit) modes of human learning. 
Conclusions 
The fact that the monism vs. dualism-debate has been a recurrent issue with no apparent 
progress seems to furnish historical proof of arguments for psychology's conceptional non-
coherence. In reply to the programmatic coexistence of more or less unrelated, sometimes 
expressly complementary classes of theory languages, we offer the discourse of 
groundedness as an overarching meta-theoretical framework for (re-) formulating 
psychological theories. Assumptions about grounds for action are nothing to be merely 
accepted desultorily – in a preliminary phase of investigation or, ex post facto, in 
interpreting the data, not to mention investing them with surplus meaning –, nor do they 
admit of being relegated to a special hermeneutic branch of knowledge. They rather call for 
and ought to be presupposed as the sine qua non to a thoroughgoing methodological 
reorientation of psychology as a whole. And the demonstration that a nomological and an 
intentional mode of thought on causes and reasons exist in parallel right within experimental 
psychology itself, in as much as relevant psychological conceptions tacitly comprise 
intentionalistic conjectures, supplies yet another cogent argument in support of seeking a 
comprehensive unitary fundament. What matters is the meaningfulness of human acting and 
the reflexiivity of the world- and self-experience finding full recognition as bounds to a 
privileged and exclusive understanding of empirical research from a third person’s 
observational point view, without relieving scientific theorising of claims for lawful 
generalisation and (causal) explanation. To interrelate one demand with the other is thus 
one centrepiece in the critical-psychological ambition to accomplish a monistic 
methodology and metatheory for a subject-scientific psychology. 
In their preface to the proceedings of the first ISTP conference, the editors Baker, Hyland, 
van Rappard and Staats concluded “it appears that theoretical psychology, as a specific focal 
point in its own right, is beginning to have an increasing role within the discipline of 
psychology” (Baker et al.,1988, p. vii). Considering the airy indifference of the 
psychological mainstream toward fundamental critique, there is some doubt that the high 
hopes from the founding period of the ISTP have materialised. Theoretical-psychological 
work seems to be condemned to be a Sisyphean task. Alas, it cannot be helped: Any 
distraction of our attention to conceptual and methodological groundwork will encourage 
Wolfgang Maiers   •   106 
 
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGIES • Vol. 1, No. 1 • 2021 
www.istp-irtp.com 
the psychological mainstream all the more so to get on with its agenda as usual – and, by 
the same token, diminish the significance of Theoretical Psychology within the discipline. 
Hence, ongoing epistemological-metatheoretical reflections on a broad front ought to be 
recognised (again) as of constant strategic importance to Theoretical Psychology and the 
field at large. 
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